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THE CHINA WE HARDLY KNOW: REVEALING THE NEW 
CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
XUAN-THAO NGUYEN* 
ABSTRACT 
The long-held and virtually unquestioned view about China from the United 
States and other Western nations is that China has a total disregard for 
intellectual property rights.  Recent empirical data and translated Chinese 
judicial decisions, however, offer a startling new picture of China that directly 
contradicts the dominant negative view of China’s approach to intellectual 
property rights.  Specifically, quantitative studies of recent Chinese patent, 
copyright, and trademark infringements cases reveal that China has become a 
litigious society and that there are more intellectual property litigation cases in 
China than in the United States.  Chinese intellectual property owners are not 
hesitant to enforce their rights against other Chinese infringers, as seen through 
the tens of thousands of cases filed and concluded annually in recent years.  
Yet these new trends in China and on intellectual property rights have not been 
recognized in academic literature or the popular press. This Article reveals a 
more accurate picture of China’s intellectual property enforcements—one that 
would assist policy makers and legal scholars in their approaches to the New 
China.  Further, this Article observes that China and the United States are at a 
crossroads with respect to intellectual property.  Quantitative and qualitative 
studies of Chinese and U.S. intellectual property cases indicate that the New 
China is quickly moving to embrace a strong intellectual property rights 
system, while the United States is slowly moving towards a weaker intellectual 
property rights regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
Whenever the words “China” and “intellectual property” appear in the 
same sentence, images of rampant piracy immediately dominate normative 
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thinking, media headlines, trade negotiations, and policy statements.1  The 
normative view of China, solidified over the years, is that private-property and 
intellectual property concepts are too foreign and abstract for China and its 
political and judicial systems to understand.2  Concerns about China’s inability 
to curb piracy of intellectual property owned by U.S. companies continue to be 
of primary interest to the U.S. government.3 
Recent empirical data and translations of Chinese court decisions on 
intellectual property rights, however, offer a startling new picture of China that 
directly contradicts the long-held view of China by the United States and the 
West with respect to intellectual property.4  The new data reveals that China 
has accelerated its embrace of intellectual property as an important asset.5  The 
Chinese society has become very protective of intellectual property rights, as 
seen through the tens of thousands of cases that were brought in recent years 
by Chinese individuals and corporations against Chinese infringers.6  Chinese 
intellectual property owners are not hesitant to enforce their rights by utilizing 
administrative and judicial means available in China.7  China’s embrace of 
intellectual property rights has not been thoroughly analyzed in either 
academic literature or in the popular press.8 
 
 1. See Peter S. Goodman, Pirated Goods Swamp China: Official Crackdown Has Little 
Effect, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at E1 (noting the “brazen and widespread” piracy of American 
intellectual property in China); U.S. Takes China Piracy Cases to WTO, NYTIMES.COM (Apr. 9, 
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-trade.5. 
5204152.html (reporting actions taken by the United States against China after bilateral talks on 
piracy failed to resolve the widespread piracy of American media). 
 2. See Goodman, supra note 1 (explaining that in communist China, with 1.3 billion 
people, “the concept of private property is neither fully understood nor valued, let alone the 
abstract notion of intellectual property”).  See also Barden Noel Gale, The Concept of Intellectual 
Property in the People’s Republic of China: Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334, 334–35 
(1978) (tracing the Chinese Marxist view of property and intellectual property).    
 3. See, e.g., Michael Falvey, Policy Options on Intellectual Property Rights: China 
Regional Study 1 (2003) (unpublished seminar paper, Industrial College of the Armed Forces), 
available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA422083 (stating U.S. policy makers are concerned 
about China’s inability to enforce international intellectual property rights). 
 4. See infra Part III, Tables 3 & 4. 
 5. See infra Part III, Table 7.  The high volume of intellectual property litigation cases filed 
by Chinese against Chinese is even more remarkable given that in China the concept of 
intellectual property is relatively new.  Cf. Goodman, supra note 1 (commenting that intellectual 
property concepts are abstract in China); Online News Hour: Intellectual Piracy in China, 
PBS.ORG (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec05/china_10-13.html 
(reporting private property was banned in China for several decades and explaining that China 
does “not fully buy the concept of ‘intellectual property’”). 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Scholarship on China thus far has focused primarily on piracy.  See, e.g., Aaron 
Schwabach, Intellectual Property Piracy: Perception and Reality in China, the United States, and 
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The new revelation of China with respect to intellectual property cases is 
even more striking when the data is compared to that of the United States, a 
nation generally known for its litigious zeal and strong intellectual property 
protections.9  In 2005, there were 12,159 patent, copyright, and trademark 
cases filed in the United States,10 compared to 10,825 cases in China.11  In 
2006, the United States saw 11,486 cases,12 while China witnessed 11,436 
intellectual property cases.13  The trend continues, as demonstrated by the fact 
that the number of intellectual property cases filed in 2007 for the United 
States totaled 10,761,14 whereas China’s was 15,159.15 
Beyond the facial conclusion that there now are more intellectual property 
litigation cases filed per year in China than in the United States, what does the 
quantitative data show us?  This Article goes beyond mere quantitative data; it 
examines the translations of written opinions rendered by courts across China 
on intellectual property rights and reaches the conclusion that China and the 
United States are at a crossroads with respect to intellectual property rights.  
 
Elsewhere, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 65 (2008); Angela M. Beam, Comment, Piracy of 
American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 335 (1995). 
 9. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 1783, 1825–26 (2007) (quoting Valerie Q. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ 
Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 
26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 93 (1992)) (stating that many Americans believe “[p]eople are too 
quick to sue” in the United States) (alteration in original); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 414 (2003); David G. Savage, A Trial Lawyer on Ticket Has Corporate 
U.S. Seeing Red, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at A1 (reporting on a poll finding that 80% of 
Americans believe that the nation is too litigious with too many lawsuits). 
 10. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE 4.7: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND 
TRADEMARK CASES FILED (2007) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007)], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2007/Table 
407.pdf.  The totals comprised three categories: copyright, trademark, and patent.  See id. 
 11. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
IN 2005 (2006) [hereinafter CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005], available 
at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200606/235422_1.html.  China’s 
totals are actually higher when accounting for intellectual property cases outside of the three 
categories—copyright, trademark, and patent—used by the United States in reaching its data.  See 
id.  When comparing Chinese filings to the United States, this paper uses sums derived from 
those three categories unless otherwise noted. 
 12. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10. 
 13. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, REPORT ON CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006 (2007) [hereinafter CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2006], available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/ 
200706/236401_1.html. 
 14. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10. 
 15. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2007 (2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2007], available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200804/237294_ 
1.html. 
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As shown by an analysis of the pertinent data and the Chinese courts’ written 
opinions, China’s embrace of intellectual property rights runs counter to the 
normative assumption of China as the land of piracy.16  More importantly, 
while China is developing a stronger intellectual property rights regime, 
advocates in the United States seek a weaker system.17 
Part II focuses on the current shift towards weaker intellectual property 
rights unfolding in the United States.  The United States is often viewed by 
people inside and outside the United States as a litigious society;18 perhaps 
soon this view will no longer hold true when compared to intellectual property 
enforcement in the emerging New China.  Claims like “there are too many 
frivolous lawsuits” and “it is too costly” to do business have become familiar 
in shaping tort litigation reform in the United States in the last decade.19  
Successful tort law reform has drastically curbed personal injury litigation.20  
In recent years, there has been a similar effort to reform intellectual property 
litigation.21  Indeed, concerted lobbying activities from various sectors of the 
U.S. economy struck a similar chord for intellectual property litigation 
reform.22 
 
 16. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 17. See infra Parts I, III.  This Article is the first in a series of articles on the New China and 
intellectual property. 
 18. See Peters, supra note 9, at 1825–26; Savage, supra note 9.  See also Michael R. Baye, 
Dan Kovenock, & Casper G. de Vries, Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-
Theoretic Approach, 115 ECON. J. 583, 583 (2005) (stating the United States is “internationally 
scorned as the ‘litigious society’”). 
 19. See Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 515 
(2000) (citing Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation, 79 
JUDICATURE 242, 244–45 (1996)) (analyzing a study claiming that more than eighty percent of 
jurors “believed that there were too many frivolous lawsuits”).  See also Stephen Daniels & 
Joanne Martin, “The Impact that It Has Had is Between People’s Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass 
Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 463 (2000) (discussing poll results and 
the decades of tort war in the United States); Remarks in a Panel Discussion on the High Cost of 
Lawsuit: Abuse at the White House Conference on the Economy, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
2949, 2950 (Dec. 15, 2004) (describing effect on businesses from litigation costs). 
 20. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, 
at 3-1 (recalling an anecdote that lawyers in Texas moved from personal injury to intellectual 
property after the state’s tort reform capped medical malpractice damages and limited punitive 
damages).  See also Alan Cohen, From P.I. to I.P.: Personal Injury Lawyers in Texas Want to 
Get into Patent Litigation, and The Roth Law Firm Is Leading the Stampede, IP LAW & BUS., 
Nov. 2005, at 36, 36 (noting the successful move by a Texas law firm from personal injury to 
intellectual property after Texas “got serious about tort reform”). 
 21. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for 
Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 113 (2008) (describing proposals to limit forum 
shopping in patent litigation). 
 22. See id. at 119 (discussing efforts to curb patent litigation costs).  See also Editorial, Stop 
the Attempt to Weaken Patent System, CONCORD MONITOR, June 25, 2007, at B4 (describing 
efforts by major corporations to weaken patent protections). 
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Proponents for intellectual property litigation reform claim that a strong 
property regime has stifled competition23 and increased litigation costs in the 
United States.24  Some critics complain that intellectual property owners, 
particularly patent holders, abuse their rights by filing too many patent 
litigation suits across the United States.25  This criticism of patent litigation is 
not supported by the evidence, which indicates that patent lawsuit filings have 
been relatively flat, averaging 2,819 patent cases filed yearly in the United 
States from 2002 to 2007.26  Nonetheless, patent litigation reform has 
generated much attention in Congress.27  While the number of patent litigation 
cases in the United States remains fairly steady, the pendulum’s tempo 
quickens for China.  In 2006, there were 3,196 patent litigation cases,28 and in 
2008, the number increased to 4,074 cases in China.29  Nevertheless, many 
corporate officers, legislators, lobbyists, and commentators demand that 
Congress revamp the current system into a weaker, more constrained 
 
 23. See, e.g., FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD’S 
TECHNOLOGY 111–12 (1994) (explaining how American and Japanese companies have been 
using patent litigation to prohibit competition).  See also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 
698, 699 (1998) (arguing that strong patent systems slow innovation in biotech).  The view that 
strong patents prohibit innovation receives support outside the United States, particularly in 
Canada and Europe.  See, e.g., James Morgan, Patent System ‘Stifling Science’, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 24, 2008, 8:56 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7632318.stm (reporting on a 
study by Canadian-based consultants Innovation Partnership calling strong intellectual property 
rights “ultimately counter-productive for both industry and consumers”). 
 24. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14–16 (2008) (suggesting litigation 
costs can limit profitability of patents).  But cf. generally Craig Opperman, James Bessen & 
Michael J. Meurer, The Patent System on Trial and Under Attack, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., 
Sept./Oct. 2008, at 36 (debating the assumptions and analysis underlying BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra). 
 25. See, e.g., Sarah Lai Stirland, Will Congress Stop High-Tech Trolls?, 37 NAT’L J. 612, 
612 (2005) (discussing widespread patent litigation abuse). 
 26. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10 (listing 2,680 patent 
suits filed in 2002); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE 4.7:  COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND 
TRADEMARK CASES FILED (2005) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2005)],  
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/Table 
407.pdf (averaging 2,833 patent suits per year from 2003 through 2007). 
 27. See sources cited infra note 31. 
 28. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13. 
 29. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2008 (2009) [hereinafter CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2008], available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200906/263973_ 
5.html. 
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intellectual property law regime, particularly regarding patent enforcement in 
the United States.30 
Part II explains the entrenched view that equates China to the piracy of 
intellectual property.  U.S. government officials, policy makers, and industry 
experts all criticize China for national and global problems relating to 
intellectual property piracy.  None have recognized the drastic transformation 
in China with respect to intellectual property protection and litigation. 
Part III quantitatively demonstrates through case analysis that China has 
embraced intellectual property rights on a massive scale.  This section 
examines the number of cases filed each year involving trademark, copyright, 
and patent infringements.  The high volume of cases filed in both lower and 
appellate courts in China from 2003 through 2007 demonstrates the 
enforcement trend.  The upward trajectory shows China has come full circle in 
recognizing and enforcing intellectual property rights. 
Part IV affirms the quantitative study of Chinese intellectual property 
litigation cases by examining the translations of written decisions opined by 
Chinese courts.  The decisions reveal that Chinese owners of intellectual 
property rights are relying on the judicial system to adjudicate their rights.  
The decisions also show that Chinese intellectual property owners are similar 
to their U.S. counterparts: They assert their rights in typical intellectual 
property infringement and breach of contract cases involving patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks. 
Part V identifies a puzzle which emerged from the quantitative and 
qualitative studies on Chinese intellectual property: there is a conspicuous 
absence of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants.  Indeed, it is 
puzzling to discover that there are few intellectual property lawsuits brought by 
foreign intellectual property owners against the Chinese, since foreign 
intellectual property owners have persistently criticized Chinese violations of 
intellectual property rights.  The absence of foreign intellectual property 
litigants perhaps results from long-held assumptions about China’s intellectual 
property piracy—assumptions which also prevent the United States from 
recognizing the recent drastic changes in China with respect to intellectual 
property enforcement.  It is time to develop a more accurate picture of China’s 
intellectual property enforcement regime; such an image would assist policy 
 
 30. See, e.g., Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, & Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26, 29–33 (2006) 
[hereinafter Patent Trolls Hearing] (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President & Chief Patent 
Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., 
COMMITTEE PRINT REGARDING PATENT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 2, 2–3 (Comm. Print 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman); id. at 133, 135 (statement of Richard C. Levin, Ph.D., 
President of Yale Univ. and co-chair of the Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights in the 
Knowledge-Based Econ. of the Nat’l Research Council); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 
701 (stating that policy-makers should establish coherent boundaries in patent law). 
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makers and legal scholars in developing their policies and approaches to the 
New China. 
I.  UNITED STATES: REJECTING A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
A. Mobilizing for Fewer Intellectual Property Rights 
The United States has positioned itself in the last few decades as a country 
with strong intellectual property protections and enforcement systems.31  
Intellectual property owners enjoy a robust intellectual property rights regime 
recognized and supported by a transparent legal system.32  Owners rely on the 
legal system to enforce their rights, enjoin infringers, and collect damages, 
either via pretrial settlements or jury awards.33  However, the strong protection 
 
 31. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2007–2008, at 12 
(2007), available at http://gcr07.weforum.org/ (follow “Explore the Report” hyperlink) (noting 
the United States strong intellectual property protection regime).  The United States has also been 
a forceful advocate for strong intellectual property protection and requests trading partners to 
follow its demands because the United States sees strong intellectual property protection as a 
method of trade barrier reduction.  See David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Paradox: The 
Political Economy of International Intellectual Property and the Paradox of Open Intellectual 
Property Models, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 101, 135–36 (2007) (observing that because 
foreign software piracy may be accomplished almost costlessly, “strong intellectual property 
protection [provided by trade partners] is viewed as a significant way to reduce trade barriers”). 
 32. See A. Bryan Endres & Peter D. Goldsmith, Alternative Business Strategies in Weak 
Intellectual Property Environments: A Law And Economics Analysis of The Agro-biotechnology 
Firm’s Strategic Dilemma, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237, 263 (2007) (describing U.S. protection of 
intellectual property as “strong”); Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: 
An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 318 (2009) (crediting the United States with a 
“strong and expansive” intellectual property regime).  See also Keith E. Maskus, The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 
9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 137 & n.182 (1998) (listing the United States as an example of 
a country with a transparent legal system); Adis M. Vila, The Role of States in Attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Case Study of Florida, South Carolina, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, 16 LAW 
& BUS. REV. AMS. 259, 261 (2010) (quoting INT’L TRADE ADMIN., USA: OPEN FOR BUSINESS 
FACT SHEET (2008), available at http://trade.gov/investamerica/usa-open-for-business.pdf) 
(“[T]he United States offers a ‘predictable and transparent legal system.’”). 
 33. Intellectual property owners enjoy their federal rights codified in comprehensive statutes.  
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1301 (2006) (copyrights); 
35 U.S.C. §§ 1–351 (2006) (patents).  Congress sometimes acts to protect American intellectual 
property rights abroad by supplementing the existing domestic protection regime with new 
legislation.  See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Hatch, Baucus Legislation Protects U.S. 
Intellectual Property, American Jobs (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=4c9e06b4-1b78-be3e-e075-
b6dc0a8537f1. 
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regime for intellectual property rights is losing steam due to criticism that the 
protection has gone too far.34 
In recent years, there have been efforts to reduce protections of intellectual 
property rights.  Opponents assert that intellectual property owners use abusive 
litigation tactics to enforce their rights, and consequently, intellectual property 
litigation, especially involving patented innovations, has gotten out of 
control.35  In response, critics of intellectual property litigation demand 
changes that would weaken intellectual property rights.36 
For example, the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy of the National Research Council claims that the 
number of patent cases has been on the rise.37  The Committee insists that the 
rise in litigation numbers has become a critical problem that must be 
addressed.38  The Committee also advocates that established legal standards in 
patent law, such as “willful infringement,” disclosure of “best mode” for 
implementing an invention, and a patent attorney’s “inequitable conduct,” 
should be either eliminated or modified to reduce patent litigation costs.39 
 
 34. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 28 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (listing criticisms from commentators); Timothy B. Lee, Vonage is the 
Latest Victim of Patent Abuse, AMERICAN (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.american.com/archive/ 
2007/april-0407/vonage-is-the-latest-victim-of-patent-abuse (asserting the U.S. patent system 
“seems to allow a deep-pocketed incumbent to drive an innovative competitor out of business”); 
Jonathan Schwartz, Tech Issues That’ll Give You Creeps, ZDNET (Oct. 29, 2004, 6:03 PM), 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-139465.html (“Companies that acquire (often questionable) 
patents and later wield them against new market participants unleash a destructive force that 
stifles innovation and prevents participation—the polar opposite of the purpose for which patents 
were created.”). 
 35. See Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 27; FED. TRADE COMM’N., supra note 34, at 
28; Stirland, supra note 25, at 612. 
 36. Cf. Anne Broache, Senators Offer Sweeping Patent System Changes, CNET NEWS (Aug. 
4, 2006, 2:21 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Senators-offer-sweeping-patent-system-changes/2100-
1028_3-6102493.html (noting concerns of investor groups that pending legislation would weaken 
patent rights). 
 37. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 134 (statement of Richard 
C. Levin, on behalf of the National Research Council) (“[L]itigation costs are escalating rapidly 
and proceedings are protracted.  Surveys conducted periodically by the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association indicate that litigation costs, millions of dollars for each party in a case 
where the stakes are substantial, are increasing at double-digit rates. At the same time the number 
of lawsuits in District Courts is increasing.”).  The National Research Council is the operating 
arm of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academies.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://sites.nationalacade 
mies.org/NRC/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
 38. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 30, at 134 (statement of Richard 
C. Levin, on behalf of the National Research Council). 
 39. See id. at 135–36 (statement of Richard C. Levin on behalf of the National Research 
Council) (advocating the need to “[m]odify or remove the subjective elements of litigation . . . 
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Numerous commentators claim that patent litigation in the United States 
“stifles substantial technological innovation” and that the patent litigation 
system is seriously “broken.”40  At congressional hearings on patent law 
reform, testimony from industry experts maintained that the rise in patent cases 
and the breakdown of the patent litigation system lie with patent owners who 
aggressively litigate to uphold their patent rights.41  The patent owners behave 
like “trolls” or extortionists,42 “harming consumers and both small and large 
innovative companies.”43  Specifically, the cost of litigation to defend against 
 
includ[ing] whether someone ‘willfully’ infringed a patent, whether a patent application included 
the ‘best mode’ for implementing an invention, and whether a patent attorney engaged in 
‘inequitable conduct’ by intentionally failing to disclose all prior art when applying for a patent.  
Investigating these questions requires time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately subjective 
pretrial discovery.  The committee believes that significantly modifying or eliminating these rules 
would increase the predictability of patent dispute outcomes without substantially affecting the 
principles that these aspects of the enforcement system were meant to promote”). 
 40. Ted Frank, There is a Role for Congress in Patent Litigation Reform, at 1, 5 (Am. Enter. 
Inst. Outlook Ser. No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080221_no1Feb 
LO_g.pdf.  See also, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 170 (2004) (comparing the patent system to an out-of-control freight train that 
is merely hanging on to its tracks). 
 41. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation 
Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 40, 42 (2006) [hereinafter Perspectives on Patents Hearing] (statement of Mark Chandler, 
Vice President and General Counsel of Cisco Systems); Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 
27–28 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner Inc.). 
 42. See Stirland, supra note 25, at 612 (discussing the origin of the phrase “patent troll”); 
Amol Sharma & Don Clark, Tech Guru Riles the Industry By Seeking Huge Patent Fees, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (“Nathan Myhrvold, renowned in the computer industry as a 
Renaissance man, has a less lofty message for tech companies these days: Pay up.”); Editorial, 
supra note 22. 
 43. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 26 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and 
Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner Inc.); Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 79, 80–81 (2005) [hereinafter Patent Law Reform Hearing] (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice 
President and Chief Patent Counsel Time Warner, Inc.) (“To illustrate problems in the current 
remedy system, imagine a company (either a large or small company) that brings an exciting new 
information service to market.  The company has invested tens of millions of dollars in research, 
equipment, marketing, etc. and may have negotiated license arrangements on a variety of patents 
needed for the service.  Then, without warning, the company is hit with a patent infringement suit 
by another patent owner the company was previously unaware of who owns a patent that relates 
to a small part of the overall service.  The patent owner demands as damages a portion of the 
monthly fee charged to subscribers for the overall service, including the new information service.  
In addition, the patent owner asks for an injunction, which would prevent the company from 
providing the service at all merely as a way to gain leverage and increase the likelihood of a 
favorable license fee.  Thus, the new service can be essentially paralyzed until the patent dispute 
is resolved . . . .  In the end, most companies settle with the patent owner rather than run the risk 
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these patent owners “sap[s] resources that would otherwise be available for 
research and innovation,” causing small companies to change their research 
agendas and large companies to develop mechanisms to fend off patent-
infringement lawsuits.44  Overall, commentators asserted that abusive patent 
litigation in the United States “deters innovation and harms our entire 
economy.”45  They urged that Congress must immediately reform patent 
litigation.46 
Critics declare that the patent system must be “restored to balance” in view 
of extortionist behavior of patent owners.47  Consequently, they champion for 
weaker patent rights.48  Specifically, they want to limit a patent owner’s right 
to obtain an injunctive relief against a defendant.  Critics insist that an 
injunction should only be made available if the patent owner can demonstrate 
that it is “likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be 
remedied by the payment of money damages alone.”49  They also propose to 
 
of litigating.  Consumers are the real losers, as they either pay the price of the litigation through 
increases in retail prices, or, in many cases, are never offered the new service.”). 
 44. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 29 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and 
Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.).  See also Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra 
note 41, at 43 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco 
Systems) (“As a result, a company creating a new product must consider whether that product 
will be sufficiently profitable to cover not only development and production costs, but also 
potential settlement payments on unjustified infringement claims.  The risk of infringement 
lawsuits will cause some firms ‘to avoid the mine field altogether, that is, refrain from 
introducing certain products for fear of holdup.’”). 
 45. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 29 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and 
Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.).  See also Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra 
note 41, at 43 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco 
Systems) (stating that patent litigation “deters innovation and thereby inflicts significant damage 
upon our entire economy”). 
 46. Frank, supra note 40, at 2 (“Current debate on patent reform is largely nonpartisan, but 
this is in large part because the organized plaintiffs’ bar does not currently have a vested interest 
in the status quo of patent litigation.  Should they obtain such a vested interest, future legislative 
efforts will have a partisan tinge that will make constructive changes more difficult.  The time for 
reform, if ever, is now.”). 
 47. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 28 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and 
Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.) (“We urge that the [patent] system be restored to 
balance in view of the reality of a new breed of middlemen patent speculators.”). 
 48. Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra note 41, at 40 (statement of Mark Chandler, 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (stating “Cisco favor[s] rule[] 
changes that some charge would decrease the value of patents” because the “patent litigation 
system is broken”). 
 49. Patent Law Reform Hearing, supra note 43, at 68, 72 (statement of Jonathan Band) 
(testifying on behalf of Visa U.S.A. and The Financial Services Roundtable).  Mr. Band 
advocated the “immediate and irreparable injury” standard in lieu of the United Kingdom’s 
“complex compulsory license provision[s].”  Id. 
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eliminate treble damages for willful patent infringement.50  The concerted 
lobbying pressure on Congress to reject long-established intellectual property 
rights has resulted in several pieces of proposed legislation to overhaul the 
patent litigation system.51 
The rejection of strong intellectual property rights is not confined to 
Congress; it has also spread to the Supreme Court.  For example, the Court in 
eBay v. MercExchange eliminated the patent owner’s right to automatic 
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.52  Before eBay, the patent owner, 
upon successfully showing that the defendant had infringed on the patent, was 
automatically entitled to injunction against the defendant.53  That meant the 
patent owner did not have to prove whether an injunction should be granted 
after the infringement had been found.  The patent owner was presumed 
irreparably harmed by the infringing conduct of the defendant.54  The right to 
automatic injunctive relief was a powerful and potent weapon that the patent 
owner could utilize to force infringers to negotiate, because the defendants 
often did not want to stop selling the infringing products in the marketplace.55  
The Federal courts had long understood the importance of injunctive relief in 
 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 10; Stirland, supra note 25, at 612 (advising treble damages only after 
malicious patent infringement). 
While the Patent Act’s provisions concerning injunctions and damages would need 
adjustment even if the Patent Office granted only valid patents, the patent quality problem 
makes the need for litigation reform all the more compelling.  The possibility of a broad 
injunction and treble damages means that a financial services institution must take even 
the most frivolous patent infringement claim seriously. 
The current rules regarding injunctions and damages place all the leverage in the 
hands of the patent owner, even if the patent is extremely weak . . . .  If Congress does not 
correct the remedies under the patent law, the surge in the number of patents relating to 
financial services will lead to financial services institutions paying out ever-larger license 
fees to holders of suspect patents, to the detriment of our customers. 
Patent Law Reform, supra note 43, at 9–10 (2005) (statement of Jonathan Band). 
 51. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 
7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 
3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. 
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 52. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
 53. See MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 
547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 54. Id.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, the Federal Circuit automatically 
granted permanent injunctions and only “in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny 
injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest.”  Id. (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 55. See Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining 
Permanent Injunctive Relief after eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 440 (2008) 
(analyzing how the power of patent holders has been greatly diminished after the eBay decision 
as patent holders face the uncertainties of no automatic injunctive remedies against defendants). 
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patent cases as “the essence of the concept of property” and, therefore, utilized 
the automatic rule to protect the property rights of the patent owner.56 
The Supreme Court, in eBay v. MercExchange, reversed the well-
established rule of automatic patent injunction, holding that patent owners no 
longer have a categorical right to injunction after prevailing in an infringement 
suit.57  Instead, the patent owners must establish that they are entitled to an 
injunction under a difficult four-part test proving: 1) irreparable injury; 2) lack 
of adequate remedies at law; 3) the public’s interest lies in the injunction; and 
4) by balancing the defendant’s and patentee’s interests.58  The decision rejects 
the strong patent protections long enjoyed by patent owners in the United 
States, removing the threat of injunction that patent owners previously utilized 
to gain leverage over alleged infringers.59 
B. Current Trends in Intellectual Property Litigation in the United States 
Statistics in recent years do not lend much support to the outcries from 
different corners of the United States seeking to reduce the rights of 
intellectual property owners and to curb litigation excesses.60  There has been 
miniscule change in the number of patent and trademark cases filed in United 
States federal district courts during the period from September 30, 2001 to 
September 30, 2007. 
An examination of patent, trademark, and copyright cases filed in federal 
district courts from 2001 to 2007 reveals the current state of litigation over 
intellectual property rights.  Table 1, infra, shows that the number of 
intellectual property cases increased during that time.  In the twelve-month 
period ending on September 30, 2002, there were 2,680 patent cases.  In 2007, 
the number was 2,878, or a seven percent increase from 2002.  For trademark 
cases, there was virtually no change.  Indeed, in the 2001–2002 fiscal year 
 
 56. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 (“Because the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent 
is but the essence of the concept of property,’ the general rule is that a permanent injunction will 
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”) (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 57. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
 58. Id. at 391, 394. 
 59. See id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A]n injunction, and the potentially serious 
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant 
fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”).  But see J. Gregory Sidak, 
Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A 
Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 718 (2008) (arguing that the extent of “held 
up” patents has been overstated). 
 60. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra note 41, at 42–43 (statement of Mark 
Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems); Patent Trolls Hearing, 
supra note 30, at 27, 29 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel of 
Time Warner, Inc.); Stirland, supra note 25, at 612–13 (noting that various trade groups are 
calling for patent reform). 
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there were 3,458 trademark cases filed and in the 2006–2007 fiscal year there 
were 3,483.  Copyright cases saw the largest increase; in the fiscal year 2001–
2002 there were 2,084 cases, whereas in the fiscal year 2006–2007 the number 
jumped to 4,400. 
Table 1 
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Cases Filed in 
U.S. District Courts During Fiscal Years 2002–200761 





2002 2,680 3,458 2,084 8,222 
2003 2,788 3,657 2,448 8,893 
2004 3,055 3,496 3,007 9,558 
2005 2,706 3,657 5,796 12,159 
2006 2,807 3,735 4,944 11,406 
2007 2,878 3,483 4,400 10,761 
Table 2 
Annual Change in Patent, Trademark and Copyright Cases 
Filed in U.S. District Courts During Fiscal Years 2002–200762 
Fiscal Year Patent Cases Trademark 
Cases 
Copyright Cases 
2002 — — — 
2003 108 (4.0%) 199 (5.8%) 364 (17.5%) 
2004 267 (9.6%) -161 (-4.4%) 559 (22.8%) 
2005 -349 (-11.4%) 161 (4.6%) 2,789 (92.8%) 
2006 101 (3.7%) 78 (2.1%) -852 (-14.7%) 
2007 71 (2.5%) 252 (-6.7%) -544 (-11.0%) 
Average 1.7% 0.3% 21.5% 
Table 2, supra, shows the percentage change for each fiscal year in cases 
filed for patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  With respect to patent cases 
filed, the percentage change from 2002 to 2003 was 4%; from 2003 to 2004 
patent filings increased by 9.6%.  The number of patent cases dropped between 
2004 and 2005 by 11.4%.  From fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, the 
change was a modest 3.7%, and from 2006 to 2007 the increase was only 
 
 61. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS (2005), supra note 26. 
 62. Calculations based on data provided in Table 1 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS (2007), supra note 10; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2005), supra note 26). 
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2.5%.  Overall, in the five-year period, the average annual percentage change 
for patent case filings was an insignificant 1.7%. 
Similarly, numbers of trademark cases filed experienced very minor 
growth.63  From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003, the filings increased 
5.8%. The number of cases filed in fiscal year 2004 dropped 4.4% from 2003.  
The percentage change showed a positive growth of 4.6% in the fiscal year 
2005 and 2.1% in the fiscal year 2006 compared to their respective prior years.  
Fiscal year 2007 showed a 6.7% decline in cases filed.  Thus, the overall 
change for trademark cases in the five-year period was flat at 0.3%. 
Copyright cases, on the other hand, showed larger, double-digit percentage 
changes.64  Most notably, in 2005 there was a very large increase of 92.8% 
growth, due in large part to actions by the music industry to slow online song 
piracy.65  During the five-year period, the yearly percentage change for 
copyright case filings averaged a 21.5% increase. 
Overall, the number of intellectual property litigation cases in the United 
States from 2002–2007 remained relatively flat in both trademark and patent 
areas.66  There were more litigation activities in the copyright field.67  These 
numbers, as a whole, fail to support the demand for a reform to intellectual 
property litigation, particularly in the area of patent reform.  Nevertheless, the 
reform demand, as discussed in Part I.A, has been relentless, as lobbyists and 
reformers portray the patent law and litigation systems to be broken and 
uncontrollable.  In the United States, the pendulum of intellectual property 
protection has begun swinging from a strong protection regime for patent 
owners towards a weaker system due to the belief that more innovation can 
only be achieved when patent owners have fewer property rights.  The 
pendulum in China is swinging in the opposite direction. 
II.  THE OLD PIRACY VIEW OF CHINA 
Countless books, reports, and comments present China as the brazen center 
of pirated goods and as having little respect for intellectual property rights.68  
 
 63. See supra Table 2. 
 64. See supra Table 2. 
 65. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2005), supra note 26 (“Filings continued to 
increase in 2005 (up 27 percent overall), primarily due to a 93 percent increase in copyright 
filings that was likely due to music companies filing infringement cases against individuals for 
downloading copyrighted recordings.”). 
 66. Supra Table 1. 
 67. Supra Table 1. 
 68. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995); ANDREW MERTHA, THE 
POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2005); Robert 
Marquand, US Targets Chinese Piracy of US Goods, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2006, 
at 7; Henry Blodget, How To Solve China’s Piracy Problem, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2005, 6:37 PM), 
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These writings assert that the piracy problem has had a severe effect on 
multinational companies; some estimates show that perhaps a third of China’s 
GDP is derived from counterfeit goods.69 
Pirated products permeate virtually every industry in China.  About 90% of 
software and 95% of video games in China are counterfeit;70 5 out of 6 
Yamaha motorcycles sold in China are not genuine;71 and more than 50% of all 
cell phones, shampoo, razor blades, chewing gum, and cigarettes sold are 
fakes.72  Counterfeit DVDs and designer goods are available for significantly 
less than authentic items.73  Over the years, counterfeiters have become more 
sophisticated and greedy as they have discovered, for example, that large 
profits can be made from counterfeited medicines like antimalarial and 
antibiotic drugs.74  Likewise, counterfeit car parts are manufactured in China to 
replace genuine parts75 and are used in both authentic and imitation cars;76 this 
yields higher monetary returns than simpler items like counterfeit DVDs. 
Not only are counterfeit products widely available in China, they are made 
for export worldwide and are estimated to be valued at approximately $60 
billion a year.77  Counterfeited goods from China have appeared in Africa, 
 
http://www.slate.com/id/2116629; Louisa Lim, Chinese Crackdown Fails to Stem Counterfeit 
Goods, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=5693207. 
 69. See, e.g., Blodget, supra note 68.  See also Evelyn Iritani, Bootleggers Raise Stakes in 
China’s Piracy Fight, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at C1 (“Copycat products account for as much 
as 15% to 20% of China’s total production.”). 
 70. Blodget, supra note 68.  See also Shaun Rein, How to Win the China Piracy Battle, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (June 20, 2007, 7:28 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/ 
jun2007/gb20070620_006304.htm (“[I]n 2005, 86% of all software used in China was pirated, 
accounting for a $3.9 billion sales loss.”). 
 71. Yamaha’s Attempt to Brake Fakes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_06/b3919013_mz001.htm. 
 72. Blodget, supra note 68. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Iritani, supra note 69 (reporting that “at least 50% of the drugs on the market in 
China are counterfeit”). 
 75. See Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before 
the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n., 109th Cong. 28, 29 (2006) (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin) (claiming that “every automotive part has turned up in the counterfeit trade, including 
windshield glass, brake fluid, headlights, tail lights, emissions components, structural parts, sheet 
metal parts, suspension parts, tires, belts, hoses and alternators.”). 
 76. See id. at 29 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“[I]n China . . . an entire car was copied, 
manufactured and sold under a different name.”).  See also GM Sues Chinese Firm for Copying, 
BBC NEWS (May 9, 2005, 10:33 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4528565.stm. 
 77. Rein, supra note 70. 
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Southeast Asia, the European Union, Canada, and the United States.78  Industry 
experts blame China’s counterfeits for the loss of jobs in the United States.79 
The piracy in China is so profound that multinational companies have 
begun experimenting with novel tactics to combat a problem that seems 
uncontrollable with conventional methods.  For example, to fight bootleg 
DVDs, which typically cost less than $1 each, Time-Warner reduced the price 
of authentic DVDs by 90% to a price of $3 per DVD.80  Microsoft, whose 
software programs are among the most popular items to pirate in China, 
worked with China’s Lenovo Company to preinstall Microsoft Windows on 
Lenovo computers.81 
The U.S. government has its own approach, albeit heavily influenced by 
U.S. intellectual property owners, to solve the Chinese piracy problem.  
Through consultations with intellectual property rights holders, the United 
States decided to shame China “for failure to effectively protect intellectual 
property rights and to meet its commitment to significantly reduce 
infringement levels.”82  On April 29, 2005, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative announced that it was placing China on the “Priority 
Watch List,” because it had “serious concerns” about China’s compliance with 
its obligations under various agreements relating to intellectual property.83  
Subsequently, the United States government utilized World Trade 
Organization enforcement procedures to bring suit against China.84 
Scholars, commentators, and industry experts have expounded many 
theories on Chinese piracy and have offered various explanations for and 
solutions to the Chinese piracy problem.85  Some are adamant about denoting 
 
 78. See Iritani, supra note 69 (Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia); Grant Gross, US, 
Canadian Agencies Seize Counterfeit Cisco Gear, CIO.COM (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.cio.com/ 
article/190651/US_Canadian_Agencies_Seize_Counterfeit_Cisco_Gear; EU, U.S. Vow 
Crackdown on Computer Counterfeits, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.reu 
ters.com/article/2008/02/22/us-eu-usa-counterfeiting-idUSL2285388920080222. 
 79. Chinese Product Counterfeiting Causes US Job Layoffs, GLOBAL BUS. CTR. (June 20, 
2007, 11:31 PM), http://global-business-center.com/r2741,Chinese_Product_Counterfeiting_ 
Causes_US_Job_Layoffs.php. 
 80. Blodget, supra note 68. 
 81. Rein, supra note 70. 
 82. Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S: China Has High Rate of 
Intellectual Property Infringement, AMERICA.GOV (Apr. 29, 2005), http://www.america.gov/ 
st/washfile-english/2005/April/20050429155355mbzemog0.5231745.html. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Jennifer A. Crane, Comment, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 95, 
118 (2008). 
 85. See, e.g., Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231 (2006). 
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“culture” as the root of the problem,86 while others focus on economics as the 
key factor.87  Still others claim use politics to explain the China piracy 
problem.88 
Despite their different approaches to the China piracy problem, experts 
nonetheless agree that China’s piracy issue lies in China’s failure to recognize 
(or its lack of respect for) private intellectual property rights and the absence of 
a strong enforcement mechanism.89  All seem to paint a picture of intellectual 
property anarchy in China, in which even the most minimal enforcement of 
intellectual property rights is lacking. 
III.  EMBRACING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
A. Defying the Normative View Through Recent Statistics 
While the United States continues to possess negative views about China 
and its intellectual property rights regime, recent statistics offer a startlingly 
different picture.  The numbers representing litigation cases brought by 
Chinese intellectual property owners reveal that China has embraced 
intellectual property rights on an unprecedented scale.  The data suggests that 
Chinese owners of intellectual property have come to highly value their 
property rights, recognize intellectual property as an important asset and utilize 
 
 86. See generally ALFORD, supra note 68.  Compare Crane, supra note 84, at 104–08 
(arguing against the view that China’s culture underlies intellectual property piracy), with Daniel 
C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 
222–23 (2006) (stating that the lack of political will to stop piracy derives from economic reliance 
on piracy). 
 87. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual 
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006). 
 88. See, e.g., MERTHA, supra note 68; Doris Estelle Long, Trademarks and the Beijing 
Olympics: Gold Medal Challenges, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 433 (2008); Wei Shi, 
The Paradox of Confucian Determinism: Tracking the Root Causes of Intellectual Property 
Rights Problem in China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 454 (2008). 
 89. See, e.g., Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, supra note 82 (explaining the United States 
government placed China on the Priority Watch List for its failure to adequately enforce 
intellectual property rights pursuant to WTO requirements); Jennifer L. Donatuti, Note, Can 
China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 203, 213–14 (2007) (noting that Chinese society has historically not valued intellectual 
property rights and protection of such rights is relatively new in China); David Barboza, China’s 
Industrial Ambition Soars to High-Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A1 (stating China has 
weak intellectual property rights enforcement and a culture of copying and stealing technology); 
U.S. Places China on Trade Watch, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 2005, at C3 (noting the head of the 
International Property Alliance believes China has failed to protect intellectual property due to 
ineffective enforcement).  But see Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights 
Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 107–08 (2003) (arguing that while 
China’s legal system fails to protect property rights, it is robust enough to provide systemic 
predictability). 
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the judicial system to adjudicate their disputes regarding intellectual property 
rights.  In fact, there are now more intellectual property cases in China than in 
the United States.90 
Table 3 
Total Intellectual Property Cases in China, 2004–200791 






200492 12,205 31.7% 11,113 
200593 16,583 35.9% 16,453 
200694 16,947 2.2% 16,750 
200795 20,781 23.0% 20,310 
 
 
 90. See infra Part III.B. 
 91. It should be noted that these totals comprise more than the sum of patent, copyright, and 
trademark cases, as the figures given by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce include other 
categories.  See, e.g., CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 92. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, WHITE PAPER ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CHINA 2004 (2006) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER 2004], available at 
http://www.chinaipr.gov/cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200604/233138_1.html (listing data 
from 2004 and the percentage increase from 2003). 
 93. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11.  The data 
represented for the “Total Percent Increase” in 2005 is different than the data provided by this 
source.  The percentage given was calculated using the data contained in WHITE PAPER 2004, 
supra note 92 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 94. See CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13.  The data 
represented for the “Total Percent Increase” in 2006 was not provided by this source.  The 
percentage given was calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2006, supra note 13. 
 95. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2007, supra note 15.  The data 
represented for the “Total Percent Increase” in 2007 was not provided by this source.  The 
percentage given was calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2007, supra note 15. 
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Table 4 
Intellectual Property Cases filed in Chinese Courts of First Instance, 
2003–200796 
Year Total Percent Increase Disposed 
Cases 
200397 6,988 — 6,860 
200498 9,329 33.5% 8,332 
200599 13,424 43.9% 13,393 
2006100 14,219 5.9% 14,056 
2007101 17,877 25.7% 17,395 
These tables contain data collected from the Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China.102  Table 3 contains the total numbers of Chinese 
intellectual property cases and encompasses patent, trademark, and copyright, 
as well as, inter alia unfair competition, technology contract, and other 
intellectual property cases from the courts of first instance, second instance, 
and retrial proceedings for each of the calendar years from 2004 to 2007.  
Table 4 contains the intellectual property cases filed in courts of first instance 
for each of the calendar years from 2003 to 2007. 
The People’s courts, or courts of first instance across China, have 
witnessed a sizeable increase in the number of intellectual property litigation 
cases in recent years.  From 1985 to 2002, the courts received only 53,319 
intellectual property civil cases of first instance.103  As indicated in Table 4, in 
 
 96. It should be noted that these totals comprise more than the sum of patent, copyright, and 
trademark cases, as the figures given by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce includes other 
categories.  See, e.g., CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 97. See WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (listing data for 2004 and the percentage increase 
from 2003). 
 98. See id. 
 99. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11.  The data 
represented for the “Percent Increase” in 2005 is different than the data provided by this source.  
The percentage given was calculated using the data contained in WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 
92 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 100. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13. 
 101. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2007, supra note 15. 
 102. The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China provides reports 
“designed to comprehensively report the IPR-related work undertaken by Ministry of Commerce, 
and to help domestic enterprises comply with the international IPR rules and safeguard their 
legitimate rights and interests.”  About Us, INTELLECTUAL PROP. PROT. IN CHINA (May 13, 
2009), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/AboutUs.shtml. 
 103. WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92.  The official report stated that from 1985 to 2004 
there were 69,636 intellectual property cases filed in courts of first instance.  Id.  Among those 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
792 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:773 
the subsequent five years, from 2003 to 2007, there were 61,837 total 
intellectual property cases filed in courts of first instance, constituting a 16% 
increase from the total number of intellectual property cases filed in the 
previous eighteen years.104 
Table 3 shows that the Chinese courts received 12,205 intellectual property 
cases in 2004, including first instance, second instance, and re-trial 
proceedings.105  The number reflects a 31.7% increase from 2003.106  The 
courts disposed of a total of 11,113 intellectual property cases.107 There were 
9,329 first-instance intellectual property cases filed in 2004, and the courts of 
first instance disposed of 8,332 cases.108 
In 2005, the number of Chinese intellectual property litigation cases filed 
continued to climb.109  That year, the courts received 16,583 intellectual 
property cases from all court levels, or an increase of 35.9% from 2004.110  The 
number of first-instance cases in 2005 was 13,424.111  In total, the courts 
disposed of 16,453 cases.112  Chinese courts concluded 13,393 first-instance 
intellectual property cases.113 
Table 3 indicates that in 2006, intellectual property cases filed totaled 
16,947.114  The number reflects an increase of 2.2% over 2005.115  Table 4 
shows that there were 14,219 intellectual property cases of first instance filed 
in 2006.116  The courts disposed of a sum of 16,750 intellectual property 
cases;117 and the courts of first instance concluded 14,056 cases.118 
Table 3 shows the statistics for the year 2007, which reveal that courts of 
all levels in China presided over 20,781 intellectual property cases, an increase 
 
cases, 18,654 involved patents, 14,708 pertained to copyrights, 6,629 involved trademarks, and 
8,368 involved “other kinds” of intellectual property rights cases such as unfair competition, trade 
secret, and technology license disputes.  Id.  The data represented for the number of intellectual 
property civil cases of the first instance from 1985 from 2003 was not provided by this source.  
The number given was calculated using the data contained in WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 
(stating that in 2004 there were 9,329 intellectual property cases filed in courts of the first 
instance, a 33.51% increase from 2003). 
 104. See supra Table 4; text accompanying note 103. 
 105. See supra Table 3. 
 106. See supra Table 3. 
 107. See supra Table 3. 
 108. See supra Table 4. 
 109. See supra Table 3. 
 110. See supra Table 3; text accompanying note 93. 
 111. See supra Table 4. 
 112. See supra Table 3. 
 113. See supra Table 4. 
 114. See supra Table 3. 
 115. See supra Table 3; text accompanying note 94. 
 116. See supra Table 4. 
 117. See supra Table 3. 
 118. See supra Table 4. 
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of 23.0% from the previous year.119  The courts disposed of 20,310 cases 
overall in 2007.120  There were 17,877 cases of first instance, as stated in Table 
4.121  The courts concluded 17,395 intellectual property cases at the first 
instance level in 2007.122 
Table 5 
First-Instance Patent Litigation Cases in China, 2003–2007 
Year Number of Cases Percent Change 
2003123 2,110 — 
2004124 2,549 20.8% 
2005125 2,947 15.6% 
2006126 3,196 8.5% 
2007127 4,041 26.4% 
Table 5 shows the recent pattern of patent litigation growth in China.128  
Patent litigation cases increased from 2,110 cases in 2003 to 2,549 in 2004, a 
20.8% change.129  The number of patent litigations rose to 2,947 cases in 2005, 
or approximately a 16% increase from the previous year.130  In 2006, China 
saw patent litigation disputes increase to 3,196 cases of first instance, 
representing a positive change of 8.5% from 2005.131  The year 2007 showed a 
 
 119. See supra Table 3; text accompanying note 95. 
 120. See supra Table 3. 
 121. See supra Table 4. 
 122. See supra Table 4. 
 123. See WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (giving 2004 data and the percentage increase 
from 2003). 
 124. Id. 
 125. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 126. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13.  The data 
represented for the “Percent Change” in 2006 was not provided by this source.  The percentage 
given was calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2006, supra note 13. 
 127. The data represented for the “Number of Cases” and “Percent Change” in 2007 was 
calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2008, 
supra note 29 (giving 2008 data and the percentage increase from 2007).  In 2008, there were 
4,074 first-instance patent litigation cases in China, up 0.82% since 2007.  Id. 
 128. See supra Table 5. 
 129. See supra WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (giving 2004 data and the percentage 
increase from 2003); Table 5. 
 130. See supra Table 5. 
 131. See supra Table 5; text accompanying note 126. 
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significant movement in patent cases; Chinese Courts accepted 4,041 first-
instance cases, an increase of 26.4%.132 
Table 6 
First-Instance Copyright Litigation Cases Filed in China 2003–2007 
Year Number of Cases Percent Change 
2003133 2,491 — 
2004134 4,264 71.2% 
2005135 6,096 43.0% 
2006136 5,719 -6.2% 
2007137 7,263 27.0% 
The data in Table 6 indicate a tremendous rise in copyright litigation in 
China from 2003 to 2007.  In 2003, there were 2,491 copyright litigation 
cases.138  The number soared to 4,264 in 2004, an increase of 71% over the 
previous year.139  The following year, 2005, showed a 43% increase in 
copyright cases, totaling 6,096—continuing the remarkable change.140  In 
2006, there were 5,719 copyright cases, a small decrease.141  The total number 
of copyright litigation cases for 2007 totaled 7,263, representing a 27% 
increase from the previous year and almost 200% more than the number of 
copyright cases filed in 2003.142 
 
 132. See supra Table 5; text accompanying note 127. 
 133. See WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (giving 2004 data and the percentage increase 
from 2003). 
 134. Id. 
 135. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 136. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13.  The data 
represented for the “Percent Change” in 2006 was not provided by this source.  The percentage 
given was calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2006, supra note 13. 
 137. The data represented for the “Number of Cases” and “Percent Change” in 2007 was 
calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2008, 
supra note 29 (giving 2008 data and the percentage increase from 2007).  In 2008, there were 
10,951 first-instance copyright litigation cases in China, up 50.78% since 2007.  Id. 
 138. See supra Table 6; WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (giving 2004 data and the 
percentage increase from 2003). 
 139. See supra Table 6. 
 140. See supra Table 6. 
 141. See supra Table 6; text accompanying note 136. 
 142. See supra Table 6; text accompanying note 137. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE CHINA WE HARDLY KNOW 795 
Table 7 
First Instance Trademark Litigation Cases Filed in China 2003–2007 
Year Number of Cases Percent Change 
2003143 926 — 
2004144 1,325 43.1% 
2005145 1,782 34.5% 
2006146 2,521 41.5% 
2007147 3,855 52.9% 
The information presented in Table 7 demonstrates that the number of 
first-instance trademark cases in China increased significantly, from 926 cases 
in 2003 to 3,855 cases in 2007, a roughly 320% increase.148  Each year during 
that five-year period saw approximate increases in trademark cases ranging 
from 35% to 53%.149 
 
 143. See WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (giving 2004 data and the percentage increase 
from 2003). 
 144. Id. 
 145. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 146. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13.  The data 
represented for the “Percent Change” in 2006 was not provided by this source.  The percentage 
given was calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11 and CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
2006, supra note 13. 
 147. The data represented for the “Number of Cases” and “Percent Change” in 2007 was 
calculated using the data contained in CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2008, 
supra note 29 (giving 2008 data and the percentage increase from 2007). In 2008, there were 
6,233 first-instance trademark litigation cases in China, up 61.69% since 2007.  Id. 
 148. See supra Table 7; text accompanying notes 146–47. 
 149. See supra Table 7. 
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B. Challenging the Old View of China and Intellectual Property 
Table 8 
Totaled Trademark, Copyright, and Patent Cases of First Instance in the United 
States and China 2003–2007 
Year China IP Cases150 United States IP 
Cases151 
2003 5,527 8,893 
2004 8,138 9,558 
2005 10,825 12,159 
2006 11,436 11,486 
2007 15,159 10,761 
Table 8 compares the yearly totals for copyright, trademark, and patent 
cases in China to those of the United States for a five-year period.152  The 
empirical data contradicts the normative view that Chinese culture makes 
protecting intellectual property rights an impossible task.  In 2004, there were 
8,138 intellectual property cases in China involving patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks.153  In the same year, the United States had 1,420 more cases than 
China.154  In 2005, China saw 10,825 new intellectual property cases in those 
categories; the United States had 12,159 cases.155  The numbers, however, took 
a sharp turn in 2006 and 2007.  Indeed, in 2006, China had 11,436 new 
intellectual property litigation cases of first instance, whereas the United States 
had 11,486.156  In 2007, China overtook the United States, with 15,159 patent, 
copyright, and trademark cases; the United States had only 10,761 cases.157 
 
 150. Calculations based on data provided in Tables 5–7, supra. 
 151. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10. 
 152. See supra Table 8. 
 153. See supra Table 8. 
 154. See supra Table 8. 
 155. See supra Table 8. 
 156. See supra Table 8. 
 157. See supra Table 8. 
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Table 9 
First-Instance Patent Litigation in China and United States 2003–2007 
Year China158 United States159 
2003 2,110 2,788 
2004 2,549 3,055 
2005 2,947 2,706 
2006 3,196 2,807 
2007 4,041 2,878 
With respect to patent litigation, one area which the United States 
Congress has recently spent valuable time attempting to reform by reducing the 
strong property rights enjoyed by patent owners,160 there is a stark difference 
between the United States and China.  Even though United States industries 
have been complaining that there are too many patent lawsuits, because patent 
owners have become too aggressive and abusive in bringing suits in the United 
States, the number of patent cases is significantly higher in China, as shown in 
Table 9, supra.  There were more patent litigation cases filed in China from 
2005 through 2007—10,184 cases, compared to 8,391 cases filed in the United 
States during the same three years.161 
In summary, these numbers demonstrate that there is now more intellectual 
property litigation in China than in the United States, a country that has been 
known for both providing robust intellectual property protection and as a 
highly litigious nation in the area of intellectual property rights.162  The 
increasing number of litigation cases in China, however, suggests that China 
has begun to value intellectual property rights.  China has demonstrated its 
willingness to utilize the judicial systems to prosecute, defend, and solve 
intellectual property disputes.  The overwhelming majority of intellectual 
property litigation in China is brought by Chinese companies and 
individuals.163  For example, in 2006, only 2.5% of intellectual property cases 
in China involved foreign litigants.164  The evidence seems to suggest that 
Chinese businesses and individuals have learned in a very short time to 
 
 158. Calculations based on data provided in Table 5, supra. 
 159. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2007), supra note 10. 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
 161. Calculations based on data provided in Table 9, supra. 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13 (reporting 
that among the 14,219 total intellectual property cases decided by the judicial system, only 353 
cases involved foreign intellectual property owners). 
 164. Id. 
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recognize and embrace the fruit of their intellectual endeavors and they are not 
hesitant to fight for their intellectual property rights. 
Quantitative data, however, does not represent the full picture of the new 
China and its embrace of intellectual property rights and reliance on the 
judicial system to protect and enforce these rights.  A review of actual cases 
provides a more complete picture. 
IV.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS AS LITIGANTS: AN EXAMINATION OF 
CASES 
Intellectual property decisions rendered by Chinese courts are available at 
www.lawinfochina.com, a site for English translations of Chinese statutes, 
cases, and other legal information.165  The Legal Information Center of Peking 
University translates Chinese legal resources into English and maintains the 
website with up-to-date data.166 
The cases in the database are translated from Chinese official sources,167 of 
which the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of China comprises the 
majority.168  The case database, according to the website, contains typical cases 
approved and released by the Court in a number of areas, including intellectual 
property.169  The cases are selected to reflect “both current and predicted future 
trends in Chinese legal practice.”170  The following are some representative 
samples of the cases and issues related to different types of intellectual 
property disputes. 
 
 165. Frequently Asked Questions, LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Faqs/ 
index.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2010). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Judicial Cases, LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Case/List.asp (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2010). 
 169. Products and Services, LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com/ProductsSer 
vices/index.asp#aboutus (last visited Aug. 29, 2010) (“The Case Law Database contains English 
translations of typical judicial decisions approved and published by the Supreme People’s Court 
or the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in the areas of administrative disputes, civil disputes, 
criminal offences, economic disputes, intellectual property law and maritime disputes.  Each case 
is an editorially-enhanced document that contains the case background, facts, parties, trial and 
appellate court procedure, reasoning and law application, and of course the court decision.”). 
 170. Id. 
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A. Enforcing Their Copyrights 
1. Huang Zhyiy v. Nanjing International Development Company171 
In this copyright infringement case, the plaintiffs (Huang Zhyiy and Xu 
Lingzhi) created, at the defendants’ request, a television advertisement for “Be 
Le Electric Appliances,” one of the defendants’ clients.172  The defendants 
subsequently used the plaintiffs’ “design and conceptual creation” for their 
advertisement but did not compensate the plaintiffs for the creation.173  No 
employment contract was executed between the parties.174  The plaintiffs filed 
a copyright infringement action against the defendants in January 1994.175  
Upon reviewing the evidence, a panel of three judges determined that the 
defendants violated the plaintiffs’ copyright and ordered the defendants pay 
25,548 yuan in reparations.176  Before rendering the decision, the court asked 
the Copyrights Bureau to conduct a comparison between the plaintiffs’ and the 
defendants’ advertising programs.177  The Copyright Bureau concluded that 
“there exist obvious innate connections between the two, [sic] it can be 
confirmed that the advertising was manufactured following the Plaintiffs’ 
conception.”178 
2. Beijing Huaqi Multimedia Corp. v. Shandong TV Station179 
The plaintiffs, producers of the “Waiting All the Way” television series, 
brought a copyright infringement action against the defendants, Shandong TV 
Station, for broadcasting the series in China and other Asian countries without 
their authorization.180  The defendants argued that they had obtained the right 
to broadcast the television series from the plaintiffs’ agent, Hongzhou Fulaite 
Advertising Originality Center (Originality Center).181  The defendants claimed 
that Originality Center had concluded a broadcasting contract for the television 
 
 171. Huang Zhi Yi Deng (Yuangao) He Nanjing Guoji Kaifa Gongsi Deng (Beigao) (黄之等 
(原告) 和南京国际 开 发公司等 (被告)) [Huang Zhiyi v. Nanjing Int’l Dev. Co.] (Nanjing Xuan 
Wu Dist. People’s Ct. Sept. 7, 1996) (Lawinfochina). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Huang Zhiyi v. Nanjing Int’l Dev. Co. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Beijing Hua Qi Duomeiti Zhizuo Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Luyin Luxiang Chuban 
Zong She Su Shandong Dianshitai Qinfan Zhuzuoquan Jiufen An (北京华企多媒体制作有限公 
司、中国音录像出版总社诉山东电视台侵犯著作 纠纷案) [Beijing Huaqi Multimedia Corp., 
China Audio, Video Publishing House v. Shandong TV Station] (Bejing Interm. People’s Ct. 
Aug. 27, 1998) (Lawinfochina). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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series with Hongzhi Corporation, who in turn entered into a broadcasting 
contract with the defendants for the television series on August 16, 1996.182  
On December 18, 1997, the Haidian District Court rejected the defendants’ 
argument because the Originality Center was not the copyright owner of the 
television series and had only obtained a limited license to broadcast the non-
satellite television series.183  The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate Court affirmed the 
lower court’s finding that the defendants failed to conduct due diligence 
verifying the scope of the contract at issue.184  The court held that the 
defendants infringed upon the copyright owned by the plaintiffs and ordered 
the parties to enter mediation, which resulted in the defendants paying 720,000 
yuan to the plaintiffs.185 
3. Liu Jingsheng v. Sohu Aitexin Information Technology (Beijing) 
Co.186 
Liu Jinsheng translated Don Quixote, and the translation was published in 
1995 by LiJiang Publishing House.187  In October 2000, Liu Jinsheng 
discovered that his translation appeared on the website of the defendant, Sohu 
Aitexin Information Technology [Beijing] Co. (Sohu), without a license 
agreement.188  Since Liu Jinsheng held the copyright to his translation of Don 
Quixote, Liu Jinsheng brought a copyright infringement action against Sohu.189  
The defendant argued that it functioned as a web operator and never published 
the translation on Sohu’s own website —www.sohu.com—but did admit that 
the translation was shown as published on www.shuku.net, www.cj888.com, 
and www.chenqinmyrice.com; the defendant also acknowledged that 
www.sohu.com linked to the three websites.190  The evidence further 
established that the plaintiff had approached the defendant to take appropriate 
measures and cease linking to the three websites that had illegally uploaded his 
work, but Sohu had refused to comply.191  On December 19, 2000, a panel of 
three judges for the Beijing Intermediate Court held that the defendant 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Beijing Huaqi Multimedia Corp., China Audio, Video Publishing House v. Shandong 
TV Station. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Liu Jing Shengsu Souhu Ai Te Xin Xinxi Jishu (Beijing) Youxian Gongsi Qinfan 
Zhuzuoquan Jiufen An (刘京胜诉搜狐爱特信信息技术 (北京) 有限公司侵犯著作 纠纷案) 
[Liu Jingsheng v. Sohu Aitexin Info. Tech. (Bejing) Co.] (Bejing Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 19, 
2006) (Lawinfochina). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Liu Jingsheng v. Sohu Aitexin Info. Tech. (Bejing) Co. 
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infringed upon Liu Jinsheng’s copyright and “caused the aggravation of the 
infringement.”192  The panel ordered Sohu to pay 3,000 yuan to Liu Jinsheng 
and make a written apology.193 
In summary, these cases reveal that Chinese owners of copyrighted works 
such as advertisements, television series, and translations understand that the 
concept of intellectual property ownership and that the unauthorized use of 
copyrights causes economic loss.  By ordering compensatory damages, the 
judicial system itself recognizes property rights and the losses incurred.  These 
types of cases are no different than the types of copyright infringement cases 
brought in the United States.194 
C. Embracing Property Rights in Patents 
1. Renda Building Materials Factory v. Xinyi Company 
The plaintiff, Renda, was the exclusive licensee of a patent for a “concrete 
thin-walled tubular member;” the license resulted from a contract between 
Renda and the inventor entered on February 16, 2001.195  In early 2002, Renda 
discovered that Xinyi Company manufactured and sold products similar to the 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. For example, in Wrench, L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., the appellants were creators of 
Psycho Chihuahua, a cartoon character of “a clever, feisty dog with an attitude; a self-confident, 
edgy, cool dog who knows what he wants and will not back down.”  256 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 
2001).  The appellants made a formal presentation to Taco Bell about using Psycho Chihuahua as 
a marketing concept.  Id. at 450.  Subsequently, Taco Bell used a well-known advertising 
company to create a similar advertisement, but did not compensate the appellants for their 
creativity.   Id. at 451.  The appellants brought a breach of implied contract suit.  Id.  They did not 
bring a copyright infringement suit against Taco Bell because the remedies under a breach of 
contract, if successfully proven at trial, would be higher than the damages available under 
copyright law.  Id. at 457. 
  Similarly, in Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., the 
plaintiff produced for the defendant the television series Goosebumps for a children’s audience, 
pursuant to an agreement between them.  336 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2003).  The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant violated the agreement by licensing the television series to others without 
obtaining the appropriate permission or compensating the plaintiff and brought a copyright 
infringement suit against the defendant.  Id. at 984. 
  Likewise, in Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., the plaintiff 
alleged copyright infringement against the defendant for disseminating an English translation of a 
Hebrew prayer book that he claimed was a verbatim copy of his prior English translation of the 
same Hebrew prayers.  312 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  The Second Circuit held that 
the plaintiff’s English translation of the Hebrew prayer book possessed the originality that 
qualified it for copyright protection.  Id. at 97. 
 195. Ren Da Jiancai Chang Su Xin Yi Gongsi Zhuanli Qinquan Jiufen An (仁达建材厂 
诉新益公司专利侵 纠纷案) [Renda Bldg. Materials Factory v. Xinyi Co.] (Sup. People’s Ct. 
Aug. 22, 2005) (Lawinfochina). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
802 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:773 
patented invention.196  The alleged infringing product contained some minor 
changes.197  Upon a comprehensive infringement analysis, the Intermediate 
Court of Dalian Municipality held that there were no essential distinctions 
between the patent and the accused products.198  The Intermediate Court 
ordered the defendant to pay 100,000 yuan to compensate the plaintiff for its 
losses.199  The defendant appealed the case to Liaoning Higher Court.200  On 
April 19, 2004, the court affirmed the Intermediate Court’s decision.201  The 
defendant then appealed the case to the Supreme People’s Court, the highest 
court in China.202  On August 22, 2005, the Court overruled the Intermediate 
Court’s decision, stating that the decision was erroneous because it ruled to 
exclude certain technical features disclosed by the patentee in the independent 
description of the invention and had erred in finding certain features of the 
accused product equivalent to a corresponding element in the patent.203 
2. Dayang Company v. Huanghe Company 
On November 19, 1999, Huanghe Company and Dayang Company entered 
into a patent licensing agreement to exploit Huanghe’s patent used in stone 
cutting, pressing, and mounding machines.204  Thereafter, the parties engaged 
in a contractual dispute relating to payment.205  Dayang filed an action to 
rescind the contract and requested Huanghe return a certain sum that was 
owed.206  Dayang also alleged that the contract was invalid because the patent 
at issue illegally monopolized the technology and impeded future technological 
progress.207  On June 16, 2004, the Supreme People’s Court held that the 
patent license obtained by Dayang from Huanghe did not violate any laws, and 
therefore, the contract was valid.208 
The above representative patent cases indicate that Chinese patent owners 
utilized their property rights by licensing the patents to others for the 
manufacture and distribution of the products based on the patents.  Patentees 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Renda Bldg. Materials Factory v. Xinyi Co. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Dayang Gongsi Su Huanghe Gongsi Zhuanli Shishi Xuke Hetong Jiufen An (大洋 
公司诉黄河公司专利实施许可合同纠纷案) [Dayang Co. v. Huanghe Co.] (Sup. People’s Ct. 
June 16, 2004) (Lawinfochina). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. (noting that a lawsuit was filed and that Dayang Company requested rescission of 
the contract and a refund of the contract price). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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and exclusive licensees enforced their patent rights against contracting parties 
and others whom breached license agreements and infringed on the patents.  
These cases also demonstrated that defendants understand their rights by 
asserting available defenses such as non-infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, patent invalidity, and patent misuse.  Both parties utilized the 
judicial system and appealed all the way to the highest courts in China.  The 
decisions in these cases reflected the courts’ understanding of the technologies 
involved in regard to patent infringement issues.  These types of cases are 
similar to the types of patent cases brought in the United States.209 
D. Trademark Cases 
1. Beijing Delifrance Food Co. v. Beijing Sun City Shopping Mall 
Plaintiff Beijing Delifrance is the owner of the Delifrance trademark 
registration for a bread product.210  In October 1992, the plaintiff entered into 
an agreement to distribute its bread to defendant, Beijing Sun City, to be sold 
under the Delifrance trademark.211  On April 14, 1993, the plaintiff stopped 
supplying the bread to the defendant.212  The defendant, in the meantime, 
decided to sell bread provided by different suppliers but under Beijing 
Delifrance’s trademark without authorization.213  The bread offered by the 
defendant had a similar shape and appearance to that produced by Beijing 
Delifrance.214  As a result, Beijing Delifrance brought a trademark 
 
 209. For example, in Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd., both the plaintiff 
and the defendant were in the business of selling lawn torches.  392 F. Supp. 2d 717, 719 
(M.D.N.C. 2005).  The plaintiff received a patent for its specific design of the copper lawn 
torches, while the defendant had a copyright on its own lawn torch design.  Id.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant infringed on its patent.  The district court issued a finding on the patent 
claim interpretations.  Id. at 721–24.  County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp. provides 
another example of patent claims in the United States.  502 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 2007).  The 
Allan Block Corporation owned the patent for the manufacturing of concrete blocks.  Id.  It 
entered into a production agreement for the patented blocks with County Materials.  Id.  Later, 
Allan Block terminated the production agreement.  Id. at 733.  County Materials then 
manufactured its own concrete block that would compete directly with the Allan Block product, 
in violation of a non-compete provision.  Id.  Allan Block brought an action to enforce the non-
compete provision of the agreement.  Id.  County Materials, however, claimed that the inclusion 
of the non-compete provision was unlawful patent misuse and an improper result of patent 
leverage.  The Seventh Circuit rejected County Materials’ patent misuse argument.  Id. at 737. 
 210. Beijing Bali Da Mofang Shipin Youxian Gongsi Su Beijing Taiyang Cheng Shangchang 
Shangbiao Qinquan Jiufen An (北京巴黎大磨坊食品有限公司诉北京太阳城商场商标侵  
纠纷案) [Bejing Delifrance Food Co. v. Bejing Sun City Shopping Mall] (Bejing Interm. 
People’s Ct. Oct. 30, 1993) (Lawinfochina). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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infringement suit against the defendant.215  On October 30, 1993, the Beijing 
Intermediate Court enjoined the defendant from its infringing conduct with 
respect to the Delifance trademark, and ordered the defendant to pay 14,897.21 
yuan.216 
2. Bi Feng Tang Company v. De Rong Tang Company 
The plaintiff claimed that its corporate name, Bi Feng Tang, functioned as 
its brand name through heavy advertising in the Shanghai catering service 
industry.217  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, De Rong Tang, beginning 
on August 13, 2002, misled the public with false publicity through using the 
name Bi Feng Tang without permission on its signboards and tables in its 
dining hall and in its advertisements.218  The plaintiff brought an unfair 
competition and infringement action against the defendant.219  On June 18, 
2003, the Shanghai Intermediate Court found that the name Bi Feng Tang was 
the general name of a cooking method or the name of a dish.220  The name Bi 
Feng Tang was not a distinctive mark of the plaintiff’s catering services.221  
The court held that the plaintiff had no right to prohibit others from using the 
name Bi Feng Tang.222 
3. Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v. Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co. 
The plaintiff, Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Company (NXC), a wedding 
photography service, obtained the trademark registration for “Xuezhong 
Caiying” (translated as “Snow-view Color Photo”) in 1996.223  The trademark 
registration was valid for ten years, from 1996 to 2006.224  NXC received wide 
recognition for its services, and was awarded the Top 10 Brand Award of 
Global Chinese Professional Wedding Photography.225  NXC discovered in 
August, 2004 that the defendant, Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Company 
(SXC), was using “Xuezhong Caiying” as a trademark and enterprise name for 
 
 215. Bejing Delifrance Food Co. v. Bejing Sun City Shopping Mall. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Bifeng Tang Gongsi Su De Rong Tang Gongsi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An 
(避风塘公司诉德权唐公司不正当竞争纠纷案) [Bi Feng Tang Co. v. De Rong Tang Co.] 
(Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. June 18, 2003) (Lawinfochina). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Bi Feng Tang Co. v. De Rong Tang Co. 
 223. Nanjing Xue Zhong Cai Ying Gongsi Su Shanghai Xue Zhong Cai Ying Gongsi Ji Qi 
Fen Gongsi Shangbiao Qinquan, Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (南京雪中彩影公司诉上海 
雪中彩影公司及其分公司商标侵 、不正当竞争纠纷案) [Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v. 
Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co.] (Jiangsu Higher People’s Ct. Aug. 26, 2005) (Lawinfochina). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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its own photography service.226  NXC brought both trademark infringement 
and unfair competition claims against the defendant.227  On May 30, 2005, the 
Nanjing Intermediate Court found that the defendant deliberately took 
advantage of the plaintiff’s famed trademark, and that its conduct caused 
consumer confusion.228  The court enjoined the defendant from using the name 
“Xuezhong Caiying” and ordered it to pay 20,000 yuan to the plaintiff.229 
Like the patent and copyright cases, the trademark cases brought by 
Chinese individuals and entities against other Chinese individuals and entities 
are normative disputes relating to intellectual property rights.  The trademark 
cases are typical of normative disputes because they are concerned with the 
uses of a mark similar or identical to someone else’s name or registered 
trademark.230 The sample disputes focused on whether the plaintiff owns a 
protectable trademark, whether the defendant’s use causes consumer 
confusion, and whether the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff’s 
trademark and used it in connection with the defendant’s goods and services.231  
These types of trademark cases are similar to the types of trademark cases 
litigated in the United States.232  Indeed, on any given day, decisions related to 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v. Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (giving rise to liability for one who uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device in connection with any good or service that is likely to 
cause confusion as to the origin or source of the good or service). 
 231. See, e.g., Nanjing Xue Zhong Cai Ying Gongsi Su Shanghai Xue Zhong Cai Ying 
Gongsi Ji Qi Fen Gongsi Shangbiao Qinquan, Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (南京雪中彩 
影公司诉上海雪中彩影公司及其分公司商标侵 、不正当竞争纠纷案) [Nanjing Xuezhong 
Caiying Co. v. Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co.] (Jiangsu Higher People’s Ct. Aug. 26, 2005) 
(Lawinfochina) (intentional use); Bifeng Tang Gongsi Su De Rong Tang Gongsi Bu Zhengdang 
Jingzheng Jiufen An (避风塘公司诉德 唐公司不正当竞争纠纷案) [Bi Feng Tang Co. v. De 
Rong Tang Co.] (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. June 18, 2003) (Lawinfochina) (consumer 
confusion); Beijing Bali Da Mofang Shipin Youxian Gongsi Su Beijing Taiyang Cheng 
Shangchang Shangbiao Qinquan Jiufen An (北京巴黎大磨坊食品有限公司诉北京太阳城商场 
商标侵 纠纷案) [Bejing Delifrance Food Co. v. Bejing Sun City Shopping Mall] (Bejing 
Interm. People’s Ct. Oct. 30, 1993) (Lawinfochina) (protectable mark). 
 232. For example, in Optimum Technologies, Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., the 
plaintiff owned the trademark “Lok-Lift” for the manufacture and sale of its carpet adhesive tape 
products.  496 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007).  The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 
defendant for the distribution of the trademarked carpet adhesive tapes to retailers nationwide.  Id. 
at 1235–36.  The defendant then internally manufactured similar tapes that had a similar package 
design, quantity, bar code, and item number as the Lok-Lift products and began distributing them 
to retailers without informing the plaintiff.  Id. at 1236–37.  The plaintiff subsequently filed an 
action of trademark infringement and unfair competition against the defendant.  Id. at 1238. 
  In Boston Duck Tours, L.P. v. Super Duck Tours, Inc., both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were in the business of offering Boston land and water sight-seeing tours.  531 F.3d 1, 
8 (1st Cir. 2008).  The plaintiff brought a trademark infringement and unfair competition suit 
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trademark infringement and unfair competition claims are being rendered 
based on similar fact patterns in both countries. 
Once more, the types of trademark cases in China are similar to those in 
the United States. The presence of Chinese trademark cases demonstrates that 
Chinese trademark owners view their trademarks as important assets in their 
business operations.  They are not hesitant to enforce their trademark rights, 
they utilize judicial means to enforce their rights, and they rely on the judicial 
system to enjoin the alleged infringing conduct.  In summary, the above 
examples of written decisions on copyright, patent, and trademark disputes 
show that the judicial system promptly resolved the cases.233 
V.  MISSING FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS IN CHINA 
While the statistics and translations of case databases reveal that Chinese 
intellectual property owners have recognized the importance of intellectual 
property, policed their rights, and employed the legal system to enforce their 
property rights, there is a peculiar absence of foreign intellectual property 
owners as litigants among the tens of thousands of cases involving intellectual 
property rights in China.234  Foreign owners of intellectual property can hardly 
be found as plaintiffs, both qualitatively and quantitatively, among the 
statistics of cases and written opinions.  Less than 5% of all intellectual 
 
against the defendant for using the words “duck tours” in connection with its services.  Id. at 10.  
The First Circuit held that “duck tour” was a generic phrase for amphibious sightseeing tours, and 
enjoys no trademark protection.  Id. at 18. 
  In Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., the manufacturer of “Beanie Babies” brought an action 
against the defendant for deliberate and willful trademark infringement conduct.  517 F.3d 494, 
496 (7th Cir. 2008).  The defendant sold products looking very much like “Beanie Babies,” and 
called them “Screenie Babies.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the defendant’s 
infringement was willful, because it had chosen the name “Screenie Beanies” and the design of its 
screen cleaners “with reckless disregard for the likelihood of consumer confusion.”  Id. at 501. 
 233. The judges disposed the majority of the cases within one to two years.  A chart tracking 
the disposition of the cases available through Law Info China is on file with the Author.  Cases 
advanced to the appellate court were also promptly resolved.  Perhaps judges in China can 
dispose of copyright cases in a much shorter timetable compared to the disposition length in the 
United States because the United States has longer and more complex discovery procedures, as 
well as pretrial, trial, and appeal processes.  See Catherine E. Creely, Comment, Prognosis 
Negative: Why the Language of the Hatch-Waxman Act Spells Trouble for Reverse Payment 
Agreements, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 155, 184 n.197 (2006) (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, at 9–10 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2693–94) (noting that the average time of disposition for 
a patent case was thirty-six months and about 10% of those cases took an average of seventy-
seven months).  The median number for the length of cases litigated in the Trademark Trials and 
Appeal Board takes 3.2 years.  See John M. Murphy, Playing the Numbers: A Quantitative Look 
at Section 2(d) Cases Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 800, 
801 (2004) (providing a comprehensive study of the litigation in recent years). 
 234. See CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13 (noting that 
in 2006, only 353 of 14,219 IP cases of first instance involved foreign litigants). 
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property cases are filed by foreign intellectual property owners.235  Examples 
of foreign litigants among the translated cases include Procter & Gamble 
Company,236 Eli Lilly Company,237 Walt Disney Company,238 and 
Starbucks.239 
Procter & Gamble Company (P&G) brought an unfair competition action 
against Shanghai Chenxuan Intelligence Technology Development Co. in 
2000.240  P&G had registered its SAFEGUARD trademark in 1976 in China for 
soap, washing and polishing preparation, and hair protecting preparation, 
among other uses.241  P&G spent a considerable monetary sum to advertise its 
trademarked products.242  It received several prestigious awards, such as the 
“Golden Bridge Award for Best-selling Domestic Goods,” “Ideal Brand,” and 
“Actually Purchased Brand.”243  P&G’s trademarked soap products were 
ranked first in the soap market.244  In 2000, the Guangzhou Administration 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce listed the plaintiff as one of the “key 
enterprises for trademark protection,” and the State Administration Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce listed the trademark SAFEGUARD “as one of [the] 
national key protected trademarks.”245  Around this time the defendant 
obtained a domain name registration for safeguard.com.cn to be used for its 
electrical and security systems engineering business.246 
Upon finding the SAFEGUARD trademark “well-known to the related 
public,” the lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the 
defendant was not entitled to any rights and interests of “safeguard” as a 
domain name.247  The lower court found that the defendant’s registration of the 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Shanghai Chen Xuan Zhineng Keji Fazhan Youxian Gongsi Wu Baojie Gongsi (上海陈 
璇智能科技发展有限公司五宝 公司) [Shanghai Chenxuam Intelligence Tech. Dev. Co. v. 
Proctor & Gamble Co.] (Shanghai Sup. People’s Ct. July 5, 2001) (Lawinfochina). 
 237. Yi Lai Li Li Gongsi Su Hao Sen Zhi Yao Gongsi Zhuanli Qinquan Jiufen An (伊莱利利 
公司诉豪森制药公司专利侵 纠纷案) [Eli Lilly & Co. v. Haosen Pharm. Co.] (Sup. People’s 
Ct. June 17, 2003) (Lawinfochina). 
 238. Meiguo Woerte Disini Gongsi Su Beijing Chuban She Deng Qinfan Zhuzuoquan Jiufen 
An (美国沃 特·迪斯尼公司诉北京出版社等侵犯著作 纠纷案) [Walt Disney Co., U.S. v. 
Beijing Publ’g Press] (Beijing Higher People’s Ct. Dec. 19, 1995) (Lawinfochina). 
 239. Xing Yuan Gongsi, Tongyi Xingbake Su Shanghai Xingbake, Shanghai Xingbake Fen 
Gongsi Shangbiao Qinquan Ji Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (星源公司、统一星巴克诉上 
海 星巴克、上海星巴克分公司商标侵 及不正当竞争纠纷案) [Starbucks Corp. v. Shanghai 
Starbucks Café Co.] (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. Dec. 20, 2006) (Lawinfochina). 
 240. Shanghai Chenxuam Intelligence Tech. Dev. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Shanghai Chenxuam Intelligence Tech. Dev. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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“safeguard” name as a domain name was a “malicious” act which “damaged 
the interest of the holder of ‘safeguard’ registered trademark.”248  The lower 
court also held that the defendant committed unfair competition.249  
Subsequently, the defendant appealed the decision to the Shanghai Superior 
Court, which then affirmed the lower court’s decision in 2001.250 
In 2001, Eli Lilly & Company (Eli Lily) asserted a patent infringement 
claim against Haosen Pharmaceutical Company.251  The case centered on Eli 
Lilly’s technique for the manufacturing of Hydrochloric Gemcitabine.252  The 
Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province admitted into evidence testing 
results from third parties to compare Eli Lilly’s products with the defendant’s 
products.253  The Jiangsu court, however, failed to make the evidence available 
to Lilly for cross-examination.254  Eli Lilly subsequently appealed the Jiangsu 
court’s decision to China’s Supreme People’s Court.255  The Third Tribunal of 
the Supreme People’s Court reversed the Jiangsu court’s decision.256 
Starbucks Corporation was successful in its trademark infringement and 
unfair competition action against a defendant coffee store for intentionally 
using the Starbucks trademark in Shanghai.257  Starbucks Corporation entered 
the China market in 2000 with several coffee stores.258  In 2003, the defendants 
began to use the name Starbucks for its own coffee shop stores.259  In 2004, the 
Shanghai Intermediate Court ruled in favor of Starbucks Corporation, and 
subsequently in 2006, the Shanghai Higher Court also affirmed the lower 
court’s decision in favor of Starbucks.260 
As a final example, in 1994 the Walt Disney Co. brought a copyright 
infringement action against Beijing Publishing Press, Children’s Publishing 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Shanghai Chenxuam Intelligence Tech. Dev. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 
 251. Yi Lai Li Li Gongsi Su Hao Sen Zhi Yao Gongsi Zhuanli Qinquan Jiufen An 
(伊莱利利公司诉豪森制药公司专利侵 纠纷案) [Eli Lilly & Co. v. Haosen Pharm. Co.] (Sup. 
People’s Ct. June 17, 2003) (Lawinfochina). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Haosen Pharm. Co. 
 257. Xing Yuan Gongsi, Tongyi Xingbake Su Shanghai Xingbake, Shanghai Xingbake Fen 
Gongsi Shangbiao Qinquan Ji Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (星源公司、统一星巴克诉上 
海 星巴克、上海星巴克分公司商标侵 及不正当竞争纠纷案) [Starbucks Corp. v. Shanghai 
Starbucks Café Co.] (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. Dec. 20, 2006) (Lawinfochina). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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Press and Grand World Company.261  The plaintiff asserted that its Classic 
Value Stories (including Bambi, Peter Pan, and seven other books) were 
duplicated and distributed by the defendants without permission.262  The 
Beijing Intermediate People’s Court enjoined the defendants’ infringement 
conduct, ordered the defendant Beijing Publishing Press to publicly apologize 
in one of the nationwide newspapers published in China, and pay a sum of 
227,094 yuan to the Walt Disney Co.263  In 1995 the appellate court, the 
Beijing Higher People’s Court, affirmed most of the rulings rendered by the 
lower court.264  The appellate court also held that defendant Beijing Publishing 
Press, not Children’s Publishing Press, should bear the damages.265  In 
addition, the appellate court held that other defendants were responsible to pay 
the damages, but not Grand World Company.266 
The cases above brought by foreign intellectual property owners represent 
only a very small percentage of cases in China.  In 2005 there were 13,424 
intellectual property cases in the first instance, but only 449 cases, or 3.3%, 
were filed by foreign intellectual property owners.267  Of the 449 cases, 108 
were filed by intellectual property owners from Hong Kong.268  The actual 
percentage of litigations filed by foreign intellectual property owners is even 
smaller, once the cases filed by Hong Kong excluded.  These percentages did 
not change much in the following year of 2006.  In that year, 14,219 
intellectual property cases were filed in the first instance, but only 353 cases, 
or 2.5%, involved foreign litigants.269 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The statistics and case databases clearly paint a new picture of the New 
China and intellectual property rights.  Chinese individuals and businesses are 
now the owners of intellectual property rights and assets.  China has created a 
vigorous enforcement environment for intellectual property.  The tens of 
thousands of cases that have been brought to the courts and decided each year 
signify a sharp pendulum swing from a weak to a strong intellectual property 
 
 261. Meiguo Woerte Disini Gongsi Su Beijing Chuban She Deng Qinfan Zhuzuoquan Jiufen 
An (美国沃 特·迪斯尼公司诉北京出版社等侵犯著作 纠纷案) [Walt Disney Co., U.S. v. 
Beijing Publ’g Press] (Beijing Higher People’s Ct. Dec. 19, 1995) (Lawinfochina). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Walt Disney Co., U.S. v. Beijing Publ’g Press. 
 267. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, supra note 11. 
 268. Id. 
 269. CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2006, supra note 13. 
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rights regime.270  The rapid changes in China’s intellectual property litigation 
through its judicial system is, indeed, confounding when the statistics are 
compared to the increasingly fewer intellectual property cases in the United 
States.271  The statistics from both countries indicate that China is now rapidly 
moving from a weak to a stronger regime while the United States is taking the 
opposite stance by moving from a strong to a more moderate direction. 
Moreover, Chinese statistics reveal another set of surprise results: The 
infinitesimally small number of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants 
in China.272  The sparse nature of these cases is contradictory to the persistent 
outcry against Chinese piracy and the abuse of intellectual property rights 
belonging to foreign owners.273  Why are so many Chinese cases, more than 
95% of them,274 brought by Chinese litigants against other Chinese?  Why has 
there been an absence of reports or studies on the transformation in China with 
respect to intellectual property rights?  Perhaps one of the reasons is that the 
long, beleaguered outcry about piracy and the long-established belief that 
China does not recognize, protect, or enforce intellectual property rights 
prevents most if not all in the United States and the West from acknowledging 
the rapid changes unfolding in China with respect to intellectual property 
litigations in recent years.  This Article perhaps will provide a new window 




 270. This confirms the observation that there is an increase in intellectual protections in China 
as the Chinese have started to become intellectual property stakeholders.  See Yu, supra note 9, at 
370–71 (discussing the creation of government agencies that handle intellectual property affairs 
and the trend of Chinese becoming stakeholders in intellectual property). 
 271. See supra Part III.B. 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 266–67. 
 273. See supra Part II. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 266–67. 
